This paper studies the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The model features a housing market. There are borrowers, who need collateral to obtain loans, and savers. Monetary policy is conducted following a Taylor rule for the interest rate. The macroprudential policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule for the loan-tovalue ratio reacting to output and house prices. Results show that introducing the macroprudential rule or extending the interest rate rule to respond to house prices increases welfare, since it enhances …nancial stability. However, when we evaluate the optimal policy mix, we …nd that when both policies act together in a coordinated way, monetary policy should focus on ensuring price stability while the macroprudential authority should care about …nancial stability.
Introduction
After the recent …nancial crisis, policy makers have realized that the traditional policies were not enough to avoid such episodes and that should be complemented with a new direction of policy interventions. As a result, several institutions have implemented macroprudential tools in order to explicitly promote the stability of the …nancial system in a global sense, not just focusing on individual companies. The goal of this kind of regulation would be to avoid the transmission of …nancial shocks to the broader economy.
Some examples of macroprudential tools are asset-side tools (loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratio caps), liquidity-based tools (countercyclical liquidity requirements) or capital-based tools (countercyclical capital bu¤ers, sectoral capital requirements or dynamic provisions).
However, this new set of macroprudential policies has to coexist with traditional policies, namely monetary policy. It is crucial to analyze how the new macroprudential measures a¤ect the conduction of monetary policy and to monitor and evaluate those policies, making sure that they do not work at cross-purposes. The objective of this paper is to study the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy.
A very important research question that we cover in this paper is whether monetary and macroprudential policies could complement each other or if the central bank, could use its interest rate instrument to foster …nancial stability. Some would argue that the conduct of macroprudential and monetary policy should be closely coordinated, even integrated, and then, that both macroprudential and monetary policy should be assigned to the central bank. In this case, the objectives of monetary policy should be expanded to include …nancial stability (Eichengreen, Rajan, and Prasad (2011), Eichengreen, El-Erian, Fraga, Ito et al. (2011)). Some others would think that macroprudential supervision should involve other regulatory agencies and the central bank should keep the only responsibility of maintaining price stability, retaining its independence. Then, monetary policy and …nancial-stability policy should be seen as di¤erent policies with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments.
In our study, we focus on a speci…c macroprudential instrument; the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The Group of Thirty (2010), a working group on macroprudential policy, recommends in its in ‡uential report, that the macroprudential supervisor considers an adjustable LTV ratio that could be varied to inhibit the swings of the economic cycle. Following this line, our model imposes a limit on borrowing, that is, loans need to be collateralized by a proportion of the value of the assets that the borrower owns. This proportion can be interpreted as an LTV. The macroprudential tool we consider is to introduce a rule that automatically increases loan-to-values when there is a boom, therefore limiting the expansion of credit.
In this paper, we propose an implementation of the macroprudential policy which is analogous to how monetary policy is conducted. In particular, we assume that the same way that the central bank follows a Taylor rule for monetary policy, the macroprudential authority also follows a linear rule to carry out the macroprudential policy. The monetary policy literature has extensively shown that simple rules result in a good performance; therefore it seems sensible to apply this kind of rules to macroprudential supervision (see, for instance, Yellen, 2010) .
The objectives of the monetary and the macroprudential authority should include output, in ‡ation and …nancial stability. In order to achieve these objectives, monetary policy uses the interest rate as an instrument while the macroprudential authority uses the LTV. However, there is not consensus about which institution should be in charge of which objectives. It is clear that monetary policy cares about in ‡ation and output stabilization but the debate on whether its objectives should also include …nancial stability is still open.
In this paper, we assume that the objective of the central bank is to maintain output and in ‡ation stabilization. Therefore, in a standard way, the central bank will follow a Taylor rule in which the interest rate is set responding to in ‡ation and output. Nevertheless, in order to add to the debate, we will also consider the case of an extended Taylor rule for monetary policy which responds to house prices as well, including among the objectives of the central bank to also maintain …nancial stability.
On the other hand, the macroprudential regulator aims at avoiding systemic risk and excessive credit growth. The IMF (2013) states that a macroeconomic environment which gives rise to credit growth will contribute to the build-up of systemic risk. Therefore, booms that lead to increase in borrowing should be moderated. They also consider that a rise in house prices can act as a leading indicator of excessive credit growth since they lead to wealth e¤ects that permit the increase in borrowing. Then, following this lines, we propose that the macroprudential regulator follows a Taylor-type rule in which the LTV responds to house prices and output.
We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with features a housing market in order to evaluate the e¤ects on the main macroeconomic variables and on welfare of a rule on the LTV interacting with a Taylor rule for monetary policy. We consider three types of Taylor rules: a simple one that responds only to in ‡ation; a standard rule that responds to in ‡ation and output; and an extended rule that responds additionally to house prices. The modelling framework consists of an economy composed by borrowers and savers. This microfounded general equilibrium model allows us to explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy and the credit market. Furthermore, such a model can deal with welfare-related questions.
Our paper is related to the strand of research that, following Iacoviello (2005) requirements ratios and monetary policies; they …nd that the macroprudential policies are most helpful to counter …nancial shocks that lead the credit and asset price booms. In a similar way, Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) examines a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; they remark the importance of identifying the source of the shock of the housing or price boom when assessing policy optimality. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the e¤ects of macroprudential policies on welfare disentangled among di¤erent Taylor rules and explicitly showing the optimality of the policy mix when the two authorities act in a coordinated way.
From a positive perspective, our results show that when the LTV rule operates in the economy, booms are moderated because a tighter limit on credit is set. However, the goals of the macroprudential regulator and the central bank are in con ‡ict when shocks come from the supply side. Furthermore, the central bank, by an appropriate combination of parameter values in the Taylor rule, could do the job of a macroprudential regulator. Nonetheless, the goals of the central bank should be extended to not only to keeping in ‡ation low but also to have a stable …nancial system.
Within this framework, we evaluate di¤erent scenarios in terms of welfare. We study how welfare changes when the macroprudential policy is introduced in the economy and conclude that this new policy is welfare enhancing. We also study if the central bank could act as a macroprudential regulator by introducing house prices in the interest rate rule. We …nd that even if the central bank could do the job of a macroprudential regulator by using the interest rate to stabilize house prices, and therefore the …nancial system, optimal policy analysis suggests that it is preferable to leave this objective to a macroprudential regulator with a di¤erent instrument to maximize welfare.
We also conclude that welfare gains are maximized when the central bank aims at stabilizing in ‡ation, responding only to prices and output, and the macroprudential regulator cares about …nancial stability, responding to output and more strongly to house prices.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents results from simulations. Section 4 o¤ers a welfare analysis of the di¤erent policies. Section 5 …nds the optimal parameter combination. Section 6 concludes.
Model Setup
The economy features patient and impatient households, a …nal goods …rm, and a central bank which conducts monetary policy. Households work and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers and borrowers, respectively. 1 Borrowers are credit constrained and need collateral to obtain loans. The representative …rm converts household labor into the …nal good.
The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates.
Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours: max Cs;t;Hs;t;Ns;t
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E 0 is the expectation operator and C s;t , H s;t and N s;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= ( 1) is the labor supply elasticity, > 0: j t represents the weight of housing in the utility function. We assume that log (j t ) = log(j) + u Jt , where u Jt follows an autoregressive process. A shock to j t represents a shock to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing demand and therefore can be interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices.
Subject to the budget constraint: 1 Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
where b t denotes bank deposits, R t is the gross return from deposits, q t is the price of housing in units of consumption, and w s;t is the real wage rate. F t are lump-sum pro…ts received from the …rms.
The …rst order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (4) represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, bene…ts for consuming housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (3) is the labor-supply condition.
Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
where b 2 (0; 1) is impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
where b t denotes bank loans and R t is the gross interest rate. k t can be interpreted as an LTV. The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings. The …rst order conditions are as follows:
where t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. 2 These …rst order conditions can be interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
Firms 2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical …nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and ‡exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The …nal good …rm chooses Y t (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
The price index is then given by:
Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005) , intermediate goods are produced according to the production function:
2 Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the collateral constraint holds with equality.
where 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. This Cobb-Douglas production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes.
This speci…cation is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justi…ed by the fact that savers are the managers of the …rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers. 3 A t represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and u At is a normally distributed shock to technology. We normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. 4 The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An intermediate good producer sells its good at price P t (z) ; and 1 ; 2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. Agents that are not able to change prices keep them …xed.
The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
where "= (" 1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is then given by:
3 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced. 4 Symmetry across …rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
Using (17) and (18) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve b t = E t b t+1 b x t +u t , that relates in ‡ation positively to future in ‡ation and negatively to the markup ( (1 ) (1 ) = ). u t is a normally distributed cost-push shock. 5 
Monetary Policy
We consider a generalized Taylor rule which responds to in ‡ation, output and house prices:
where 0 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, and R 0; R y 0; R q 0 measure the response of interest rates to current in ‡ation, output and house prices, respectively. " Rt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2 " . The reason for considering this generalized Taylor rule is that by making the central bank respond to house prices, we are giving the institution a way to implement a macroprudential policy. Notice that increasing the interest rate whenever house prices increase is restricting credit booms in the economy.
A Macroprudential Rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a …xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of GDP, credits, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple illustration of how a macroprudential policy could work in practice. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential regulator is to avoid situations that lead to an excessive credit growth; when there is a boom in the economy or house prices increase, agents borrow more. Therefore, we take output and house prices as leading indicators of credit growth and consequently consider a Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to output and house prices: 6
where k SS is a steady state value for the loan-to-value ratio, and k y 0; k q 0 measure the response of the loan-to-to value to output and house prices, respectively. This kind of rule would deliver a lower LTV ratio in booms, when output and house prices are high, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit boom derived from good economic conditions.
Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
The total supply of housing is …xed and it is normalized to unity:
3 Simulation
Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, s , is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98. 7 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady state, consistent with the US data. We set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1. 8 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set k SS to 0.90, in line with the US data. 9 The labor income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005) . 10 For the Taylor rule, we consider three cases which we call "the simple Taylor rule", "the Taylor rule," and "the extended Taylor rule." The simple Taylor rule only responds to in ‡ation, so that R = 0:5; R y = 0; R q = 0, the Taylor rule, corresponds to a standard case in which R = 0:5; R y = 0:5; R q = 0 and the extended Taylor rule in which R = 0:5; R y = 0:5; R q = 0:1. For we use 0.8, which re ‡ects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing. 11 We consider two types of shocks for our impulse responses, a technology shock, and a housing demand shock. The latter can be interpreted as a house price shock, since it is directly transmitted to house prices.
We assume that technology, A t , follows an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally distributed shock. 12 We also assume that the weight of housing on the utility function is equal to its value in the steady state plus a shock which follows an autoregressive process with 0:95 persistence. 13 For the reactions parameters in the LTV rule we tentatively use 0:05 and perform a sensitivity analysis to this value. Table 2 presents the volatilities derived from the model with respect to those found in the data. 14 We …nd that the model does pretty well in matching standard deviations of the main variables, and it is the case for the three Taylor rules analysed. The standard deviation of in ‡ation is lower than the one found in the data, especially when the Taylor rule responds only to in ‡ation. The model does particularly well in terms of matching house price volatility. 
Business Cycle Properties

Impulse Responses
In order to gain some insight about the dynamics of the model, in this section, we simulate the impulse responses of the baseline model given a supply shock (technology shock) and demand shock (housing demand shock).
In the impulse responses, the solid line represents the situation when there is no macroprudential policy. This is the benchmark. Then, in each …gure, we compare this benchmark, solid line, with the situation in which a macroprudential policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio that responds to output and house prices. Notice that we have three di¤erent monetary policies:
-When the central bank responds to in ‡ation (Simple Taylor Rule).
-When the central bank responds to in ‡ation and output (Taylor Rule).
-When the central bank responds to in ‡ation, output, and house prices (Extended Taylor Rule).
The reason why we consider three types of Taylor rules is that, as pointed out by Iacoviello (2005), a Taylor rule in which the output parameter is set to zero ampli…es the …nancial accelerator mechanism since the central bank does not intervene when output falls. Then, introducing a response to output in the policy rule makes it more restrictive. If, additionally, the interest rate also responds to house prices, the Taylor rule becomes even tougher. In some sense, we could interpret these extended rules as being macroprudential by themselves, since they are constraining the …nancial accelerator by increasing the interest rates in booms and therefore constraining credit. Therefore, the introduction of a second macroprudential tool could be redundant.
Therefore, the objective of this section is to compare the responses of the combination of these three monetary policies and the macroprudential policy with respect to the benchmark for a demand shock and a supply shock. Figure 1 shows impulse responses to a 2.24 percent standard deviation shock to technology for output, borrowing, in ‡ation, interest rate, and house prices. 15 The e¤ects of the shock for output are stronger when the simple Taylor rule is in place. When the central bank follows the standard and the extended Taylor rules, the output expansion makes interest rates not to go down as much as with the simple Taylor rule. This measure reduces the impact of the shock. The macroprudential regulator reacts more strongly with respect to the benchmark when the central bank keeps the simple Taylor rule. In all cases, the increase in the LTV helps to soften the e¤ects of the shock in output.
Technology shock
The highest di¤erence appears in the borrowing with the simple TR. In this case, borrowers bene…t from higher output and lower interest rate and they can borrow more. The rise in output activates the LTV rule and the collateral constraint becomes tighter. Therefore, the e¤ects on borrowing of the shock are not so strong. The macroprudential policy can help to moderate borrowing in all cases but is more relevant in the simple TR.
Even if in ‡ation is decreasing in all cases, it is higher when the simple TR is in place. The reason is because there is a demand impulse due to higher borrowing that leads to a higher in ‡ation in the simple TR.
The interest rate reacts more in the simple TR because this rule reduces the interest rate only when prices are lower. The TR and the extended TR react with a lower interest rate when prices go down but the reduction is not so high because these Taylor rules respond also to a higher output with higher interest rates. In all cases, the macroprudential policy causes a higher reduction of the interest rate, greater with the simple TR, because in ‡ation decreases by more due to the fall in demand by borrowers.
Then, the interest rate drop is larger in this case.
House prices react like any other asset to the interest rate, then they increase even more when the macroprudential policy is active because the interest rate decreases by more in this case. Figure 2 presents the responses of the LTV ratio to the technology shock. We see here that there is a con ‡ict between the monetary policy and the macroprudential policy. The macroprudential regulator makes the LTV tighter to react to a higher output. However, the central bank is reducing the interest rate with all TR due to lower prices. This lower interest rate expands more the output and this forces the macroprudential regulator to reduce even more the LTV. The di¤erence is lower in the extended TR where the interest rate does not fall as much because the central bank also responds to a higher output.
In contrast, the simple TR only reacts to prices and the con ‡ict is stronger.
Housing Demand Shock
We consider a housing demand shock of a 25% standard deviation. This would generate an increase of a 25 percent in house prices. In Figure 3 , we observe the impulse response functions for output, borrowing, in ‡ation, interest rate, and house prices.
In the case of the output, the increase in house prices directly a¤ects the collateral constraint and borrowers are able to borrow more out of their housing collateral, which is worth more now. Wealth e¤ects allow them consume both more houses and consumption goods. The increase in house prices is therefore transmitted to the real economy and output increases. When we compare the case without macroprudential policy (solid line) and with the macroprudential policy in place (dashed line), we …nd that in all three cases considered (simple TR, TR, and extended TR), the shock is moderated thanks to the macroprudential policy. This is due to the fact that the macroprudential policy reacts to the increase in the house prices reducing the LTV, restricting the credit in the economy. Therefore, a lower LTV moderates the demand shock decreasing credit in the economy and reducing the increase in output.
There is a slight di¤erence in the magnitude of the response function for the output in the extended TR; in this case, the central bank reacts directly to the shock in the house prices with a higher interest rate. 
No Macroprudential Macroprudential
Output does not increase as much as in the other two monetary policies, both with the macroprudential policy and without it. Furthermore, all the Taylor rules respond to the higher in ‡ation produced by the expansion of output with higher interest rates.
Borrowing is lower for the three monetary policy rules when the macroprudential policy is active: a tighter LTV makes borrowers reduce their leverage.
In the case of in ‡ation, the macroprudential policy helps to control it in all cases. For the extended TR, in ‡ation is even lower because the monetary policy reacts immediately to the shock with a higher interest rate.
The impulse responses for interest rate are showing signi…cant di¤erences. When the macroprudential policy is not active, the highest reaction appears in the extended TR because of the previously mentioned direct reaction to the shock. Then, it follows the TR, because it reacts to the increase in output and in in ‡ation. Finally, the lower response is in the simple TR when the central bank only increases interest rate when in ‡ation emerges. In all cases, the reaction of the central bank is moderated when the macroprudential policy is in place.
House prices'impulse responses functions are lower when the macroprudential policy is not in place because in this case the central bank reacts more in terms of the interest rate. Since the house price is the price of an asset, a higher interest rate will reduce its price. The interest rate pushes house prices down more strongly when the macroprudential rule is not active. Therefore, the boom is mitigated when the macroprudential rule is in place.
Then, with a demand side shock, monetary and macroprudential policies reinforce each other because Figure 4 displays the response of the LTV to a housing demand shock. We see that both policies go in the same direction. The macroprudential regulator cuts the LTV while interest rates go up, both limiting the expansion of credit. We also observe that, in this case, when we have an extended TR, the LTV does not need to respond in such a strong way as compared to the other two rules because monetary policy is already helping the macroprudential regulator to control house prices and output deviations from the steady state.
Welfare
Welfare Measure
To assess the normative implications of the di¤erent policies, we numerically evaluate the welfare derived in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008) , the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter Figure 3 : Impulse responses to a housing demand shock. Macroprudential versus no macroprudential approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately. 16 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers, respectively, as follows:
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we de…ne social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Each agent´s welfare is weighted by her discount factor; respectively, so that the all the groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
However, in order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. We are interested give away in order to obtain the bene…ts of the macroprudential policy. Then, when there is a welfare gain, households would be willing to pay in consumption units for the measure to be implemented because it is welfare improving. We present welfare results as the equivalent in consumption units of this welfare improvement. The derivation of the welfare bene…ts in terms of consumption equivalent units is as follows:
where the superscripts in the welfare values denote the benchmark case when macroprudential policies are not introduced and the case in which they are, respectively. 17 
Welfare Analysis of the LTV rule, given Monetary Policy
In this section, we numerically evaluate welfare in the model. As in the impulse responses, we consider three di¤erent cases for monetary policy; …rst, a Taylor rule which responds just to in ‡ation, that is, order to simplify things and gain some insight, we restrict the analysis to the case in which both reaction parameters are equal. In the next section, we relax this restriction and …nd the optimal parameters. Figures 5 and 6 show the welfare gains of introducing a macroprudential tool based on the LTV in the economy, given the Taylor rule in place. Figure 5 shows three panels comparing the welfare e¤ects for each agent and the total for each di¤erent Taylor rule, when the parameters of the LTV rule change. Figure 6 , in turn, compares the total welfare gain for the three Taylor rules. 18 The conclusions we can obtain from the …gures are the following. Using both policy measures at the same time is unambiguously welfare enhancing. Welfare of borrowers increases with the introduction of the macroprudential rule because tightening the collateral constraint avoids situations of overindebtness in which debt repayments are a burden for them and can bene…t from more …nancial stability in the economy. Notice that borrowers have a collateral constraint which is always binding and this does not 1 8 Welfare units are presented in percent. allow them make consumption smoothing. 19 A more stable …nancial system smooths their consumption path thus mitigating the negative e¤ects of the collateral constraint. This welfare gain is at the expense of savers, who lose from having this measure in the economy, given that they are not …nancially constrained.
However, the borrowers welfare gain compensates the loss of the savers and globally, the measure is welfare increasing. We also see that welfare increases by more, the larger the response of the LTV to house prices and output is, but up to a point in which welfare stops increasing. Nevertheless, if we compare across Taylor rules, we see that for the standard and the extended ones, welfare gains are not as large as in the case in which the central bank has only one objective. The reason is that, as we have seen, introducing a positive output and house price reaction to the interest rate restricts the …nancial accelerator e¤ect in the economy, then, it is a macroprudential policy by itself. Therefore, introducing an extra macroprudential policy, although it helps stabilizing the …nancial system, can be redundant.
Then, we can conclude that the central bank, by an appropriate combination of parameter values in the Taylor rule could do the job of a macroprudential regulator. However, the goals of the central bank should be extended to not only to keeping in ‡ation low but also to have a stable …nancial system. The open question here would be if these two objectives could be in con ‡ict at some point and it would be better to have a separate institution in charge of the stability of the …nancial system.
Optimal LTV rule, given Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we optimize the parameters of the LTV rule taking the Taylor rule parameters as given.
This would be a special case in which regulators act in a non coordinated way. The macroprudential regulator would …nd the best response taken as given the parameters of the Taylor rule. 20 Table 3 shows results: We see that in order to maximize welfare, the LTV rule should respond relatively more aggressive to house prices than to output. In fact, the output response is negligible. We observe that the house price response is larger when the Taylor rule is only focusing on in ‡ation because there is no room for …nancial stabilization in monetary policy. However, when the Taylor rule is extended to respond to output and house prices, the macroprudential policy does not need to be as aggressive as in the other cases because monetary policy is contributing to the same goal. Another issue to notice, as we saw in the previous section, is that welfare gains from introducing a macroprudential tool are larger in the case of the simple Taylor rule. 21 
Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies
In this section, we …nd the optimal combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare. We take as a benchmark the model with monetary policy, when the optimized Taylor rule responds to in ‡ation and output, which is the standard case. Then, we consider two cases: one in which the Taylor rule is extended to include house prices and there is no LTV rule, so that it is a Taylor rule with a macroprudential component but just one instrument, the interest rate; and one in which we optimize both the Taylor rule and the LTV rule, so that there are two instruments, the LTV and the interest rate. This latter 2 0 To characterize the full solution of the non-coordinated game one should …nd the best response of the macroprudential regulator given di¤erent combinations of monetary policies and vice versa. The intersection between these two best responses would be the Nash equilibrium. 2 1 Note that welfare gains are large because we are considering as a benchmark a case in which monetary policy is not optimized. Next section considers monetary policy optimization.
case would correspond to a coordinated game. In this case, we can think of a single regulator with two instruments (interest rate and LTV) and three objectives (in ‡ation, output and …nancial stability), or two regulators that perfectly coordinate their actions. Table 4 shows results of the policy optimization. The …rst column shows the optimal parameters of the standard Taylor rule that responds to output and in ‡ation, that we will take as our benchmark. The second column presents the optimal parameters of the extended Taylor rule that responds to output, in ‡ation and house prices and displays welfare gains with respect to the benchmark. Finally, the third column shows the optimal mix of parameters for both macroprudential and monetary policy, considering the extended TR for monetary policy, since it is the most general case. It also shows the welfare gains with respect to the benchmark monetary policy only scenario. 22 The benchmark optimized Taylor rule (…rst column) is one that responds aggressively against in ‡ation and output. If we allow for house prices in the Taylor rule (second column, extended TR), we observe that it is optimal for the central bank to have a positive response to them. This case would be equivalent to having the central bank do the job of a macroprudential regulator but with just one instrument, the interest rate. We can see that there are welfare gains from introducing house prices in the central bank rule. Gains are coming especially from borrowers, who enjoy a more stable …nancial system without compromising output and in ‡ation response. Nevertheless, savers are slightly worse o¤, since they would prefer that the central bank focused just on in ‡ation stabilization and did not include more objectives 2 2 Note that the standard deviation of the LTV instrument is 2.4011.
in its policy.
When we optimize over all the parameters and …nd the coordinated policy welfare gains with respect to the benchmark are larger (third column). In this case, gains come from the savers side. Savers are better o¤ in a situation in which monetary policy uses its instrument to …ght against in ‡ation and the macroprudential regulator cares about …nancial stability with a di¤erent instrument. However, borrowers prefer the previous situation, in which …nancial stability is controlled through interest rates so that they can bene…t from this scenario without tightening the collateral constraint. We see that the optimal macroprudential rule responds relatively more aggressively to house prices than to output because house prices appear directly in the collateral constraint and are responsible for …nancial stability. If we allow for monetary policy to respond to output, the optimal response is very small. Nevertheless, if we also allow the central bank to set interest rates responding to house prices, in order to enhance …nancial stability, it is not optimal to do so.
These results suggest that the optimal monetary policy is to …ght against in ‡ation and leave the …nancial stability goal for a macroprudential regulator. Even if we allow for the extended Taylor rule to take place, the optimal thing to do for the central bank is not to respond to house prices, this seems to be the job of the macroprudential regulator.
In conclusion, the central bank could use the interest rate to stabilize house prices and therefore the …nancial system. However, optimal policy analysis suggests that it is preferable to leave this objective to a macroprudential regulator with a di¤erent instrument.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have aimed at analyzing the impact of macroprudential policies both on the main economic variables and on welfare. In particular, we consider a macroprudential rule on the LTV ratio.
We …nd that introducing a macroprudential tool mitigates the e¤ects of booms in the economy by restricting credit. We also …nd that monetary policy and macroprudential policy may enter in con ‡ict when shocks come from the supply side of the economy.
From a normative point of view, we …nd several interesting results: First, unambiguously, when monetary policy and a rule for the LTV ratio interact, the introduction of this macroprudential measure is welfare enhancing. Second, welfare gains increase when the LTV responds more aggressively to changes in output and house prices. Third, welfare gains are larger if the central bank is responding only to in ‡ation. The reason is that this extended Taylor rule could be considered macroprudential by itself because it restricts the …nancial accelerator e¤ect. Then, introducing an extra macroprudential measure may be redundant.
Finally, we calculate the combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare. We …nd that the optimal LTV rule is one that responds relatively more aggressively to house prices than output deviations.
Results also show that welfare is maximized when the central bank focuses on …ghting against in ‡ation and leaves the goal of ensuring a stable …nancial system to a di¤erent institution. 
